\u3ci\u3eSmoking Guns: The Supreme Court\u27s Willingness to Lower Procedural Barriers to Merits Review in Cases Involving Egregious Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System\u3c/i\u3e by Leonetti, Carrie
Marquette Law Review
Volume 101
Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 6
Smoking Guns: The Supreme Court's Willingness to
Lower Procedural Barriers to Merits Review in Cases
Involving Egregious Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice
System
Carrie Leonetti
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Carrie Leonetti, Smoking Guns: The Supreme Court's Willingness to Lower Procedural Barriers to Merits Review in Cases Involving Egregious
Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 101 Marq. L. Rev. 205 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol101/iss1/6
LEONETTI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17 2:48 PM 
 
SMOKING GUNS: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S WILLINGNESS TO 
LOWER PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO 
MERITS REVIEW IN CASES INVOLVING 
EGREGIOUS RACIAL BIAS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
CARRIE LEONETTI* 
The systematic foreclosure of federal-court review of even the most 
meritorious federal constitutional challenges of state criminal convictions has 
made review on the merits of an inmate’s claim that a state court violated the 
U.S. Constitution in adjudicating a criminal case exceedingly rare.  
Nonetheless, over the past two terms, the Supreme Court appears to have 
started down a different road, overlooking potential procedural hurdles in 
several cases to uphold on the merits state inmates’ claims that their criminal 
trials were tainted by explicit race discrimination.  While these cases taken 
together seem to suggest that the Court is willing to address egregious and 
somewhat isolated acts of racial bias in the criminal-justice system, it remains 
to be seen whether this willingness will extend to more systemic and implicit 
biases.  The hope of this Article is that the Court will continue this line of cases 
to its logical conclusion with a new jurisprudence that addresses the significant 
disparate racial impacts in the criminal-justice system even when there is no 
“smoking gun.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last several decades have seen a largely coordinated lockstep march by 
Congress and the Supreme Court to foreclose federal-court review of even 
meritorious federal constitutional challenges to state criminal justice 
procedures.1  For example, in Camreta v. Greene,2 a case involving an allegedly 
unconstitutional seizure and interview of a nine-year-old child by child 
protective services workers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the officials, 
holding on the merits that the interview had been unconstitutional but found 
that qualified immunity barred any recovery of damages because, at the time of 
the interview, its illegality had not been clearly established.3  Despite having 
won below, the officials appealed to the Supreme Court wanting the Court to 
overturn the merits holding (which would establish clear precedent for the 
future) in light of the procedural bar, and the Court obliged—the result being 
that the constitutionality of such interviews will never be conclusively 
determined in the context of a tort suit because the procedural bar of qualified 
 
1. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 174 (2011); 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007) (holding, 
pursuant to the deferential standard of review required by § 2254(d), that the Arizona state courts’ 
determination that Landrigan’s defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence during his 
capital sentencing proceeding did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel was not an 
unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s earlier cases); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 
77 (2003) (holding, pursuant to the deferential standard of review required by § 2254(d), that the 
California Court of Appeals’s decision affirming Andrade’s sentence of two consecutive terms of life 
imprisonment for a “third strike” conviction of petty theft was not an unreasonable application of the 
Eighth Amendment’s requirement of proportionality); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 27 
(2002) (holding that the California Court of Appeals’s decision that Visciotti’s defense attorneys failure 
to present or argue readily available evidence of his severe brain damage in mitigation during his 
capital sentencing proceeding did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel was not an 
unreasonable application of the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 
U.S. 202, 212–13 (2003). 
2. 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (holding that, because it was not clearly established that the warrantless 
seizure of a young child by state investigators for an interview about allegations of sexual abuse 
violated the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of official immunity, the court of appeals should not 
have reached the merits issue of whether the conduct was unconstitutional in the first instance), rev’g 
588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). 
3. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3 at 1021–22, 1030, 1033.  The Ninth Circuit opted to reach the 
merits issue, the immunity bar notwithstanding, to provide guidance for government officials in the 
future.  See Camreta, 563 U.S. at 699–700. 
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immunity will always operate to frustrate the merits claim.4 
 In Harrington v. Richter,5 Joshua Richter and a companion, Christian 
Branscombe, entered the home of Joshua Johnson, a drug dealer with whom 
Branscombe was acquainted, at approximately 4:00 a.m.6  A gun battle ensued, 
during which Johnson was shot and injured and his houseguest, Patrick Klein, 
was shot and killed.7  Johnson later told the police that he had awoken to find 
Richter and Branscombe burglarizing his home, when they shot him and then 
Klein, who was asleep on the living-room sofa.8  Richter had a very different 
version of the night’s events.  He claimed that he had been waiting outside the 
residence in his truck when Branscombe went in to drop something off for 
Johnson’s roommate, Tony, and then he heard shouting and gunshots.9  
According to Richter, when he went inside, he found Klein lying in the doorway 
to Johnson’s bedroom.10  Branscombe claimed that Johnson had shot Klein 
when he awoke suddenly in the middle of the night and tried to hit him 
(Branscombe) but missed.11  Both versions of events (Johnson’s and Richter 
and Branscombe’s) had significant credibility issues, including that Johnson, 
Klein, and Richter had all smoked marijuana together a few hours before the 
shootings.12 
The crime-scene investigation revealed two large pools of blood in the 
home: one in Johnson’s bed and one in the doorway between Johnson’s 
bedroom and the living room, where Klein had been sleeping.13  The State’s 
theory was that both pools of blood were from Johnson, who had been shot in 
bed but later stood in the doorway waiting for the police to arrive.14  The defense 
theory was that at least some of the doorway blood was Klein’s, which refuted 
Johnson’s version of events and corroborated Richter’s.15  Mid-trial, the State 
asked two forensic experts to perform additional tests from the crime scene: a 
 
4. See Camreta, 563 U.S. at 694. 
5. 562 U.S. 86 (2010). 
6. See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), rev’d sub nom.  
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2010). 
7. Id. 
8. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 93. 
9. See Richter, 578 F.3d at 948 
10. Id.  
11. See id.  
12. See id. at 947–50. 
13. Id. at 948. 
14. Id. at 953. 
15. See id. 
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blood-spatter-pattern analysis and serological tests.16  The State’s blood-spatter 
expert concluded (and then immediately testified, without prior notice to the 
defense), from photos of the crime scene, that the blood pattern in the doorway 
was inconsistent with Klein having been shot there and then later moved to the 
sofa (Richter’s theory).17  The State’s serologist concluded (and then 
immediately testified, also without prior defense notice) that the blood from the 
doorway was inconsistent with Klein’s blood type.18  Richter’s trial attorney 
did not consult any independent forensic experts, either prior to trial as part of 
his preparation or during trial to evaluate the State’s last-minute expert 
testimony and offered no forensic evidence to rebut the State’s expert’s 
claims.19  Richter’s murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the 
California Court of Appeals.20 
Richter’s postconviction attorneys conducted the forensic investigation that 
his trial counsel had failed to perform.  In the process, they obtained 
declarations from four experts.  One expert, a blood-spatter-pattern expert, 
reached the opposite conclusion as the State’s experts—namely, that the blood 
patterns in the doorway were inconsistent with Johnson having bled while 
standing there.21  Two other experts, both serologists, reached the opposite 
conclusion of the State’s serologist and found that blood type analysis of the 
blood taken from Johnson’s bedroom doorway could not exclude Klein as a 
source.22  The final expert, a pathologist, opined that the amount of blood in the 
doorway was too great to be accounted for by Johnson’s relatively minor 
gunshot wounds.23  The California Supreme Court summarily denied Richter 
postconviction relief in a one-sentence order.24  An en banc panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals found that Richter was entitled to federal habeas relief 
on the ground that his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in 
failing to discover and present the exculpatory forensic evidence discovered by 
his postconviction counsel.25  The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, 
holding that federal habeas review of Richter’s conviction was precluded by the 
California Supreme Court’s prior adjudication of his ineffective-assistance-of-
 
16. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 94–95 (2010). 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
19. Richter, 578 F.3d at 954. 
20. Richter, 562 U.S. at 95. 
21. Id. at 96. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See id. at 97. 
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counsel claim on its merits because the court’s rejection of his claim was not 
unreasonable.26  In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted: “If this standard 
is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”27 
In Cullen v. Pinholster, decided during the same term as Richter, during the 
death-penalty phase of Scott Pinholster’s murder trial, the State of California 
offered eight witnesses to testify about Pinholster’s lengthy history of 
threatening and violent behavior.28  In response, Pinholster’s attorney called 
only his mother to offer evidence in mitigation of the sought-after death 
sentence.29  After hearing this evidence, the jury unanimously recommended 
the death penalty, which the sentencing judge imposed.30  During state 
postconviction proceedings, Pinholster’s attorneys unearthed a substantial 
amount of evidence documenting his severe mental illness, including “school, 
medical, and legal records,” and the diagnosis of a psychiatrist who opined that 
his behavior resulted, in part, from bipolar disorder, none of which his trial 
counsel had discovered (or therefore presented to his sentencing jury).31  
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court twice summarily denied his claim 
that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during his 
capital sentencing proceedings.32  After an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
granted Pinholster federal habeas relief on the ground that the state courts’ 
failure to recognize the ineffective assistance of his penalty-phase counsel 
constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.33  The 
Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief, holding that Pinholster was not 
entitled to federal habeas corpus relief and that the district court should not have 
considered any evidence (i.e., that was adduced at the federal habeas hearing) 
that was not presented to the first state court that adjudicated Pinholster’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.34 
 
26. See id. at 112–13. 
27. Id. at 96. 
28. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 176–77 (2010). 
29. Id.  Pinholster’s mother described his troubled childhood and what a lovely son he was (the 
two brutal murders for which he was on trial notwithstanding).  Id. at 174, 177. 
30. See id. at 177. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 177–78. 
33. See id. at 180 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s application of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that, in order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, a postconviction petitioner must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced the proceedings below)). 
34. See id. at 180–81. 
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The current iteration of the federal habeas corpus statute,35 the vehicle by 
which most federal constitutional challenges to state criminal adjudication 
arrive in (or are kept from) federal court, precludes federal-court review of the 
constitutionality of the conduct of state trials for a host of reasons, including: a 
strict statute of limitations;36 bars to review arising from the failure to exhaust 
state remedies37 and the default of independent state procedural rules;38 strict 
limits on when federal habeas courts may hold evidentiary hearings;39 and a 
highly deferential standard of review for state court rulings.40  The result is that 
a review on the merits of an inmate’s claim that a state court violated the federal 
constitution in adjudicating a criminal case is the unicorn of federal jurisdiction: 
lots of people dream of seeing one, but almost no one ever does.  
Of course, any observer of federal jurisdiction knows that the height of the 
procedural barrier to review tends to correlate with the willingness (or lack 
thereof) of the court being asked to review, to do so.  Richard Fallon has argued 
that the Court erects high procedural barriers when it wishes to avoid a difficult 
underlying substantive issue.41  Pamela Karlan has analyzed the Court’s use of 
“analytic and regulatory techniques” to segregate racial-bias challenges to 
criminal procedure from the rest of its equal protection jurisprudence.42 
 
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
36. See id. § 2244(d).  
37. See id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
38. See id. § 2254(c). 
39. See id. § 2254(e)(2). 
40. See id. § 2254(d). 
41. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on 
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 passim (1984) (discussing City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983) (holding that Lyons lacked standing to seek an injunction against 
the Los Angeles Police Department chokehold policy to which he had been illegally subject because 
he could not prove that he would be subjected to the chokehold procedure again in the future)); cf. 
Christopher E. Smith & John Burrow, Race-ing into the Twenty-First Century: The Supreme Court 
and the (E)Quality of Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 279, 288 (1997) (criticizing “the Supreme Court’s 
tolerance for pretextual, race-based exclusion of African-American and other jurors”). 
42. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2002 (1998); see, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996) (holding that 
the subjective motives of police officers, including intentional racial profiling, could not render a 
search or seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 
(1987) (rejecting the sufficiency of the statistical evidence of racially disparate impact that McCleskey 
provided in support of his challenge of racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty 
because it did not demonstrate intentional racial discrimination); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
495–96, 502 (1974) (holding that Black citizens lacked standing to sue county officials for systematic 
racial discrimination in the local criminal-justice system because they could not prove that they would 
be arrested, charged, and discriminated against again in the future); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion, which held that 
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During the 2015 term, the Supreme Court appeared to open the door a crack 
to addressing claims of racial bias in the criminal-justice system in the context 
of a claim of racially motivated jury selection that was arguably barred by 
procedural default.43  Then, during the 2016 term, the Supreme Court reversed 
on the merits two more cases involving challenges to apparent racial bias in the 
criminal-justice system that lower courts had found, repeatedly, to be 
procedurally barred.44 
Are these isolated anomalies?  If Fallon and Karlan are right, is the Court 
signaling a willingness to tackle head on issues of racial bias in the criminal-
justice system, even when doing so requires it to elide serious concerns about 
the procedural posture of the state criminal cases that it is being asked to 
review?  And, if so, will that willingness extend to the more subtle, hidden, and 
systemic implicit biases that plague the system? 
Part II of this Article provides background on the Court’s traditional “race 
is different” jurisprudence in criminal-procedure cases.  Part III discusses 
Foster v. Chapman,45 in which the Court, during the 2015 term, reversed 
Foster’s conviction for capital murder after finding that the State of Georgia 
had engaged in racially discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes in 
composing his death-qualified jury.  Part IV discusses Buck v. Stephens46 and 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,47 two cases involving criminal convictions that 
the Court reversed during the 2016 term on race-discrimination grounds.  Part 
V notes that Foster, Buck, and Pena-Rodriguez, all involved explicit, 
intentional appeals to racial bias, rather than more subtle forms of racial bias, 
which courts have traditionally been loath to address on their merits.  Part VI 
concludes that the larger question left open by these cases is whether the Court’s 
willingness to bend the procedural rules and open itself to claims of racial bias 
will extend to the more nefarious, systemic, and common implicit biases, that 
pervade the criminal-justice system. 
II. RACE IS DIFFERENT: AN ANCIENT PEDIGREE 
There is, of course, a very old pedigree for the idea that racial 
discrimination, particularly against Black Americans, is different in a way that 
 
the Fourth Amendment permitted full custodial arrests for any offense, no matter how minor, for 
ignoring the relationship between the arrest power and racial profiling).   
43. See infra Part III. 
44. See infra Part IV. 
45. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
46. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). 
47. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
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requires extraordinary remedies, most notably in the context of the right to trial 
by jury, going back to cases like Strauder v. West Virginia.48  In Strauder, a 
Black defendant charged with murder in state court challenged the State’s 
practice of trying him by a de jure all-white jury under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment.49  The Supreme Court held that 
equal protection included a prohibition against being tried by a jury from which 
people of color had been excluded.50  In reaching its holding, the Court 
reasoned: 
 We do not say that within the limits from which it is not 
excluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the 
qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing make 
discriminations.  It may confine the selection to males, to 
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to 
persons having educational qualifications.  We do not believe 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.  
Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose.  Its aim 
was against discrimination because of race or color.  As we 
have said more than once, its design was to protect an 
emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal 
discriminations against those who belong to it.51 
Having found that Strauder’s all-white state jury was unconstitutional, the 
Court then went further, ordering, pursuant to a federal Reconstruction statute, 
that his case be removed from state court to federal court for trial, analogizing 
the federal jurisdiction at issue to federal-question jurisdiction.52 
Since Strauder, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated a belief that 
concerns involving racial animus outweigh the concerns like finality and 
efficiency that underlie most procedural barriers.  For example, in Aldridge v. 
United States,53 the Court reversed Aldridge’s murder conviction for killing a 
white police officer after the trial court refused to engage in in-depth voir dire 
of one juror’s potentially disqualifying racial biases against Aldridge, who was 
Black, reasoning: “Despite the privileges accorded to the negro, we do not think 
that it can be said that the possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify 
the risk in forbidding the inquiry.”54  The Court reinforced the need for inquiry 
 
48. See 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
49. See id. at 304. 
50. See id. at 310. 
51. Id.  
52. See id. at 312. 
53. 283 U.S. 308 (1931). 
54. Id. at 309, 314–15. 
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into the potential for race-based bias in the attitudes of potential white jurors in 
the trials of Black defendants in Ham v. South Carolina—a drug prosecution 
against a prominent Black civil-rights activist involving charges that Ham 
asserted were racially motivated55—where the Court held that the risk of racial 
bias in jury deliberations was so serious that due process required that Ham’s 
attorney be given the opportunity to engage in voir dire on the issue.56 
III. OCTOBER TERM 2015: RACIALLY MOTIVATED USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES 
The State of Georgia charged Timothy Foster with capital murder, for 
which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death.57  At the end of the 
first phase of jury selection during which prospective jurors were excused for 
cause, there remained a pool of forty-two “qualified” prospective jurors.58  Five 
of those forty-two remaining jurors were Black.59  The State had ten peremptory 
strikes available to it.60  It used nine of them, four to strike the four Black jurors 
 
55. 409 U.S. 524, 525–26 (1973). 
56. See id. at 524, 526, 529. 
57. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (2016). 
58. Id. at 1743.  Jury selection in criminal cases typically takes place in two phases.  First, the 
parties make challenges to prospective jurors for “cause,” by alleging reasons why they cannot fairly 
and impartially decide the case.  See id.  In the context of the death penalty, many of these challenges 
for cause involve issues relating to prospective jurors’ personal beliefs about capital punishment.  For 
example, a juror who expresses an inability to ever vote in favor of the death penalty will usually be 
stricken at this phase for cause, a process referred to as Witherspooning, because of the Supreme Court 
case recognizing that strong and inflexible beliefs about the death penalty could amount to juror bias 
warranting striking those jurors who held them for cause.  See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 
520–22 (1968) (authorizing the exclusion of prospective jurors in death-penalty cases if their personal 
opposition to the death penalty unequivocally compromised their ability to follow the law in 
determining the accused’s guilt or punishment).  Once these cause strikes (which are not limited in 
number) have been litigated, the second phase of jury selection involves the parties’ exercise of their 
peremptory challenges, which are strikes that the parties can make against any remaining jurors without 
having to show a disqualifying bias.  See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.  The parties have a set number of 
these peremptory challenges, id., which they can make for any or no reason other than impermissible 
discrimination.  Id. at 1754–55; see Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory 
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 
981–82 (1996). 
59. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743, 1750.  
60. Id. at 1743; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 15–12–165 (1985).  
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in the pool, until an all-white jury remained.61  Foster objected on Batson 
grounds.62 
In response, the State proffered a host of facially race-neutral explanations 
for striking each of the jurors.63  Collectively, however, the State’s explanations 
suffered from a host of credibility defects.  Many of the explanations were 
subjective or vague.  These explanations included the failure to make eye 
contact,64 being “curt,”65 seeming nervous,66 responding to voir dire questions 
too slowly,67 and equivocating in answering questions about views on the death 
penalty.68  Other explanations, while facially neutral, seemed only to apply to 
Black prospective jurors.  For example, the State claimed to have stricken Black 
jurors for being divorced,69 for being relatively young (and therefore too close 
in age to Foster),70 and for living too near the crime scene,71 while failing to 
strike white jurors who were also divorced,72 lived even closer to the crime 
scene,73 or the juror who was the youngest in the venire at twenty-one years old 
and white.74  Other explanations were flatly inconsistent with one another.  For 
example, the State claimed to strike one Black juror for having unsuccessfully 
sought to be excused for cause during the first phase of jury selection75 and 
another for not wanting to be excused.76  While either reason might be plausible 
standing alone (a prospective juror trying to get out of jury service might hold 
conscription against one or both of the parties; a prospective juror who wants 
to serve on a jury might have an ulterior motive for service), they are 
inconsistent when used together to strike half of the Black jurors in the venire.77 
 
61. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743. 
62. Id. at 1742–43 (referencing Batson v. Kenucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (establishing the 
procedure by which a Black defendant alleging that members of his race had been impermissibly 
excluded from his venire could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination)).   
63. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743–45, 1748, 1750, 1754. 
64. See id. at 1748. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1751. 
68. See id. at 1754. 
69. See id. at 1750. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 1751. 
72. Id. at 1750. 
73. See id. at 1751. 
74. See id. at 1750–51. 
75. Id. at 1751. 
76. Id. at 1748. 
77. See id. at 1754. 
LEONETTI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:48 PM 
2017] SMOKING GUNS 215 
Despite the obvious credibility concerns with the State’s putative race-
neutral reasons for the disparate impact of its exercise of peremptory strikes on 
Black prospective jurors, the trial court rejected Foster’s Batson challenge, and 
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that decision on appeal.78  While Foster’s 
petition for postconviction relief was pending in the state trial court, he 
acquired, through discovery, documents relating to prosecutors’ conduct of jury 
selection, including the jury venire list, juror questionnaires,79 and their 
personal notes from jury selection.80  All of the documents were explicitly 
coded for race: the venire list had handwritten “B”s next to each Black 
prospective juror’s name;81 the race of the prospective Black jurors was circled 
on each of their questionnaires;82 and the handwritten notes included comments 
like “No Black Church” next to Black jurors’ names.83 
During the postconviction proceedings, the State offered an affidavit from 
a prosecution investigator who had participated in the prosecution team’s jury 
selection process.84  The affidavit entered in evidence, however, had been 
redacted to remove the following sentences from the original before its 
submission to the court: “If it comes down to having to pick one of the Black 
jurors, [this one] might be okay. . . .  [I]f we had to pick a Black juror, I 
recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors.”85 
The state postconviction court denied relief to Foster on two alternative 
grounds: (1) that Foster’s Batson claim was not reviewable on postconviction 
review, under the doctrine of res judicata, because it had already been fully and 
finally litigated to his detriment on direct appeal; and (2) that Foster had offered 
insufficient evidence of intentional racial discrimination.86  The latter holding 
(the rejection of Foster’s postconviction Batson claim on its merits) presented 
a federal question for the Supreme Court to review (whether Foster’s conviction 
was obtained in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).87  
The former holding (that the state common law doctrine of res judicata 
 
78. See id. at 1743. 
79. Prospective jurors are asked to fill out questionnaires answering general questions about their 
life, employment, family, and community ties prior to the start of individualized jury voir dire.  See 
generally ABA, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, Principle 11(A)(1) (2005). 
80. See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743–44. 
81. Id. at 1744. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (alterations in original). 
86. See id. at 1745. 
87. Id. at 1742–43. 
LEONETTI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:47 PM 
216 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:205 
precluded reversing Foster’s conviction on Batson grounds), on the other hand, 
was arguably an independent and adequate state-law ground that would 
preclude the Court’s federal question review of the merits holding.88  Rather 
than punt by finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the Court found (after some 
stretching) that the Georgia court’s first holding was essentially rendered dicta 
when it continued on to reach the second merits holding.89  The Court then 
proceeded to reverse the Georgia court’s Batson holding, finding that its 
“shifting explanations,” “misrepresentations of the record,” “persistent focus 
on race in the prosecution’s file,” and the fact that the State’s proffered reasons 
for striking Black panelists applied equally to white panelists who were not 
stricken, combined to be powerful “circumstantial evidence that ‘bear[s] upon 
the issue of racial animosity’” requiring the conclusion “that the strikes of [two 
Black jurors] were ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’”90 
The Court’s willingness to overlook a possible jurisdictional barrier to 
reaching the merits of Foster’s racial discrimination claim is all the more 
noteworthy given that it has previously (and fairly recently) refused to equate 
even implausible purportedly race-neutral explanations for the use of 
peremptory strikes with impermissible discrimination.  In 1994, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered habeas corpus relief for 
Jimmy Elem after the State of Missouri, had stricken two Black prospective 
jurors from his jury because the prosecutor did not like the look of their haircuts 
 
88. See id. at 1745–46; see also, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 310, 321 (2010) (holding 
that California’s time limitation on applications for habeas corpus relief was an independent and 
adequate state-law ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 
(2009) (holding that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule could provide an adequate basis in state 
law to bar federal habeas review of Kindler’s conviction); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 533–34 
(1992) (holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address Sochor’s claim that his 
sentencing court instruction to his capital sentencing jury about “heinousness” as an aggravating factor 
violated the U.S. Constitution because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision affirming his death 
sentence rested on the adequate and independent state-law ground that he had not preserved the claim 
for appellate review); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991) (holding that the state 
procedural rule requiring dismissal of Coleman’s state-court appeal, due to untimely notice of appeal, 
was based on an independent state-law ground that precluded federal habeas review of his conviction); 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037, 1043–44, 1053 (1983) (holding that the Supreme Court did 
not lack jurisdiction to decide whether the search of the passenger compartment of Long’s vehicle 
during an investigatory stop of an occupant violated the Fourth Amendment, even though the Michigan 
Supreme Court had found that the search violated both the federal and state constitution, because the 
Michigan court’s state constitutional decision was not an adequate and independent state-law ground 
on which to sustain its decision in the absence of the federal constitutional determination). 
89. See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1745–47. 
90. Id. at 1754 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 485 (2008)). 
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and facial hair.91  The Eighth Circuit presumed that the State’s proffered race-
neutral reasons had to be pretextual, since there was no obvious relationship 
between hairstyles and qualifications and the State had not offered any 
additional information.92  The Supreme Court summarily reversed the grant of 
habeas relief, without argument and over a strenuous dissent, rejecting the 
Eighth Circuit’s assumption that “silly” and “implausible or fantastic” 
explanations could not be facially race neutral, even when together they led to 
a racially disparate pattern of strikes.93 
Similarly, in Wilkerson v. Texas,94 the Court denied certiorari of the 
question as to whether jurors could be examined and excluded on the basis of 
their negative, potentially racist perceptions of defense counsel.95  In Thaler v. 
Haynes,96 the Court, in a per curiam order, summarily rejected a Batson 
challenge to a trial court’s failure to inquire further after a prosecutor offered, 
by way of a race-neutral reason, that he excluded a prospective Black juror 
because of the juror’s “demeanor” rather than race.97  In Felker v. Jackson,98 
the Court, in another per curiam order, summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
grant of federal habeas relief on Batson grounds because the court failed 
adequately to defer to the factual findings of the state courts below.99 
IV. OCTOBER TERM 2016: CLAIMS OF RACIAL BIAS IN CRIMINAL 
ADJUDICATION 
It was possible that Foster was simply an anomaly or was motivated by 
federal-jurisdiction principles rather than a desire to talk about race and the 
criminal-justice system, but the Court, during the 2016 term, unearthed two 
more analogous cases involving racial animus out from underneath what 
seemed to be high procedural hurdles and, in doing so, echoed themes from 
Foster.100 
 
91. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766–67 (1995).   
92. See id. at 767. 
93. Id. at 768, 770. 
94. 493 U.S. 924 (1989) (Mem.) 
95. Id. at 924 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
96. 559 U.S. 43 (2010) (per curiam). 
97. See id. at 48–49. 
98. 562 U.S. 594 (2011) (per curiam). 
99. See id. at 597–98. 
100. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
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A. Racial Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty 
The State of Texas convicted Duane Buck of the capital murder of his ex-
girlfriend and her male friend.101  Buck’s guilt was not at issue, but whether he 
should be executed for his crime was.102  During the penalty phase, the primary 
aggravating factor at issue was Buck’s future dangerousness.103  In determining 
future dangerousness, psychiatric experts utilize multi-factored statistical 
models to predict a defendant’s risk based, primarily, on the aggregate impact 
of categorical, actuarial factors like age, race, marital status, criminal history, 
certain personality traits, etc.104  During Buck’s court-appointed defense 
attorney’s direct examination of his psychiatric expert, Dr. Walter Quijano, the 
attorney elicited answers from him about the individual components of his risk 
model, including the race factor.105  In response, Quijano opined: “It’s a sad 
commentary that minorities, Hispanics and Black people, are over represented 
in the Criminal Justice System.”106  The prosecutor followed up on the defense 
attorney’s line of inquiry on cross-examination, asking Quijano to make explicit 
the implicit import of his direct examination testimony—namely, that Buck was 
more likely to pose a danger, because he was Black, than a similarly situated 
white man, asking: “[T]he race factor, [B]lack, increases the future 
dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?”107  Without 
objection from the defense attorney, Quijano responded, “Yes.”108  The court, 
on the jury’s recommendation, ultimately sentenced Buck to death.109 
The postconviction procedural history in Buck is multilayered and 
complicated, but what follows is as brief a summary as possible of its relevant 
components.  In 1997, Buck filed his first state petition seeking habeas relief 
from his death sentence.110  In it, his state habeas counsel failed to challenge the 
 
101. Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, 669 (5th Cir. 2015). 
102. See id. at 669–71. 
103. Id. at 669–70.  The State alleged that the likelihood of Buck’s future commission of criminal 
acts was high enough that he would pose a continuing threat to society if he was not put to death, a 
special question requiring an affirmative answer for his death eligibility.  See id. at 669.  See generally 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (2013) (establishing the future-dangerousness 
factor). 
104. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 
275, 283–85 (2006). 
105. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 669. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 670. 
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admission of the race-based dangerousness testimony at his sentencing 
proceeding on any ground.111 
In 2000, in an unrelated case, the Texas Attorney General confessed error, 
before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in permitting sentencing-phase 
experts to testify in death-penalty cases that race increased certain defendants’ 
likelihood of future dangerousness.112  In doing so, the State identified several 
other cases in which it had elicited similar testimony, including Buck, and 
notified the respective defense attorneys in those cases.113 
In 2002, Buck filed a second state habeas corpus petition alleging the 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of his sentencing counsel for his role in 
eliciting and failing to object to the race-based dangerousness testimony.114  At 
the request of the State (despite its apparent pledge not to do so), the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Buck’s successive petition as an abuse of 
the writ.115 
In 2004, Buck filed a federal petition for habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that his sentencing counsel’s ineffective assistance violated the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.116  The district court denied relief 
on the ground that Buck had procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance 
claim by failing to raise it in his first state habeas petition, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial.117 
In 2013, Buck filed a third state habeas petition.118  While that petition was 
pending in the Texas state courts, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Trevino v. Thaler,119 which found Texas’s provision of state habeas counsel to 
be so inadequate that the failure of state habeas counsel to raise issues would 
 
111. See id. 
112. See id.  Quijano was apparently a regular expert for the State in capital sentencing 
proceedings, and so the State frequently elicited testimony from him on direct examination that was 
similar to what was elicited on cross-examination in Buck.  See id. 
113. See id.  The record below is inconclusive regarding the exact chronology of events 
surrounding the State’s confession of error with regard to Buck’s case because Buck never had a 
hearing on the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but there is some evidence to 
suggest that the State of Texas, at this period of time, also agreed not to raise procedural bars to relief 
for the affected defendants.  See id. at 670 n.1. 
114. Id. at 670. 
115. See id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 671. 
119. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
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not bar federal relief under Martinez v. Ryan.120  Despite Trevino, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, in a narrowly decided 4–3 decision, again dismissed 
Buck’s third petition as an abuse of the writ.121 
In 2014, Buck filed a motion for relief from judgment in federal district 
court, on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, under Rule 60(b).122  
Rule 60(b) permits a plaintiff to challenge a previous ruling that precluded a 
determination of a federal question on the merits, but does not permit a plaintiff 
to challenge a prior merits-based ruling.123  The district court denied Buck’s 
motion on the ground that there were no extraordinary circumstances justifying 
relief from judgment.124  The court also denied Buck a certificate of 
appealability (COA) to the Fifth Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that 
denial, concluding that the case was “not an extraordinary circumstance in the 
habeas context.”125 
Buck filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asking review of 
the Fifth Circuit’s denial of his COA.126  After more than a decade of 
postconviction petitions and motions to both state and federal courts, Buck has 
never had a hearing on the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim.127  The question on which the Court granted certiorari review was, 
therefore, rather tortured: 
[D]id the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of 
Appealability (COA) standard . . . when it denied Mr. Buck a 
COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits 
review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified 
that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future 
 
120. See id. at 1921 (citing 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (holding that ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel could establish cause to excuse the failure of a federal habeas petitioner to 
exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in state postconviction proceedings)). 
121. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 671. 
122. Id.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (authorizing relief from a final judgment that is void 
or otherwise unjust).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, govern federal habeas corpus proceedings because habeas corpus functions as a collateral 
challenge to a state criminal conviction by way of a civil suit against the custodian of the inmate 
challenging the constitutionality of the state adjudication as a basis for confinement.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 note (2012) (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, Rule 12, 
Advisory Committee Note). 
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
124. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 671. 
125. Id. at 671, 673–74. 
126. Brief for Petitioner at i, Buck, 623 F. App’x 668 (No. 15-8049). 
127. Id. at 1. 
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because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a 
prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at 
sentencing?128 
While the procedural posture of Buck meant that the Court was being asked 
to review the strictness of the standard under which the Fifth Circuit determines 
whether to grant COAs, the oral arguments focused primarily on the underlying 
merits of Buck’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the significant and 
pervasive effect that the impact of Buck’s race being a dangerousness factor 
may have had on his sentencing jury.129  Chief Justice Roberts questioned the 
Texas Solicitor General at length about the possibility that the jury may have 
condemned Buck to death because it “had this evidence that he was, by virtue 
of his race, likely to be dangerous.”130 
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s denial of the COA.131  While the 
narrow question presented to the Court, again, involved the COA standard, the 
Court nonetheless decided to address “the underlying merits” to Buck’s claim, 
reasoning, extraordinarily, that, because the parties had briefed the issues, it 
was “proper to meet the decision below and the arguments of the parties on 
their own terms.”132  On the issue of Buck’s ineffective-assistance claim, the 
Court found Buck’s sentencing counsel to have engaged in deficient 
performance, explaining: 
Given that the jury had to make a finding of future 
dangerousness before it could impose a death sentence, Dr. 
Quijano’s report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin 
made him more deserving of execution. It would be patently 
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to 
be a future danger because of his race.133 
The Court also found that Buck’s counsel’s deficient performance—two 
fleeting references to the relationship between race and dangerousness—was so 
prejudicial that, without it, there was a reasonable probability that the jury 
would not have sentenced him to death, “notwithstanding the nature of Buck’s 
crime and his behavior in its aftermath.”134  Rejecting the State’s suggestion 
that the impact of these brief, cryptic references to race was de minimis, the 
Court concluded: 
[A]ccording to Dr. Quijano, that immutable characteristic 
 
128. Id. at i. 
129. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Buck, 623 F. App’x 668 (No. 15-8049). 
130. Id. at 30. 
131. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017). 
132. Id. at 775. 
133. Id. (citation omitted). 
134. Id. at 776. 
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carried with it an “[i]ncreased probability” of future violence.  
Here was hard statistical evidence—from an expert—to guide 
an otherwise speculative inquiry.  
 And it was potent evidence.  Dr. Quijano’s testimony 
appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of [B]lack men 
as “violence prone.”  In combination with the substance of the 
jury’s inquiry, this created something of a perfect storm.  Dr. 
Quijano’s opinion coincided precisely with a particularly 
noxious strain of racial prejudice, which itself coincided 
precisely with the central question at sentencing.  The effect of 
this unusual confluence of factors was to provide support for 
making a decision on life or death on the basis of race. 
. . . . 
 . . . [W]hen a jury hears expert testimony that expressly 
makes a defendant’s race directly pertinent on the question 
of life or death, the impact of that evidence cannot be 
measured simply by how much air time it received at trial 
or how many pages it occupies in the record.  Some toxins 
can be deadly in small doses.135 
The Court then addressed the procedural hurdle to Buck’s success on these 
merits: whether Buck could use a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a case so 
extensively and conclusively litigated.136  The Court concluded that Buck 
presented “extraordinary circumstances” justifying extraordinary relief and that 
the district court had abused its discretion in deciding otherwise.137  The Court 
explained: 
Buck may have been sentenced to death in part because of his 
race.  As an initial matter, this is a disturbing departure from a 
basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes 
people for what they do, not who they are.  Dispensing 
punishment on the basis of an immutable characteristic flatly 
contravenes this guiding principle. . . .   
 This departure from basic principle was exacerbated 
because it concerned race.  “Discrimination on the basis of 
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice.” 138  
The Court dismissed the invited-error aspect of Buck’s case—namely, that it 
had been defense counsel, rather than the prosecutor, that had elicited the 
 
135. Id. at 776–77 (citations omitted). 
136. Id. at 777. 
137. Id. at 778. 
138. Id. at 778 (citation omitted). 
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racially discriminatory testimony: “Regardless of which party first broached the 
subject, race was . . . put to the jury ‘as a factor . . . to weigh in making its 
determination.’”139  
Finally, the Court refused to entertain the State’s argument that Buck was 
not entitled to retroactive application of Martinez and Trevino at such a late 
stage in the proceedings, not because the argument lacked merit, but because: 
“If we were to entertain the State’s eleventh-hour [retroactivity] argument and 
find it persuasive, Buck’s Strickland and Rule 60(b)(6) contentions—the issues 
we thought worthy of review—would be insulated from our consideration.”140  
The Court, therefore, declined to reach the retroactivity question and concluded 
that Martinez and Trevino applied retroactively only to Buck’s claim, while 
reserving the right to find them not to be retroactive as applied to any other 
habeas petitioners in the future.141 
B. Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations 
The State of Colorado charged Miguel Pena-Rodriguez, who is Chicano, 
with harassing and assaulting two teenage girls in a women’s room at the 
racetrack where he worked.142  In his defense, he offered alibi testimony from 
a friend and coworker, who is also Chicano, that they were working together at 
the time of the alleged attack.143  After the jury found Pena-Rodriguez guilty of 
some of the charges, jurors came forward to report that, during deliberation, 
one juror, who self-identified as a former law-enforcement officer, had claimed, 
relying on previous investigative experience, that “I think he did it because he’s 
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”144 
Unfortunately for Pena-Rodriguez, however, Colorado, like most 
jurisdictions, has a jury verdict non-impeachment rule, which states: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith.145 
 
139. Id. at 779 (second alteration in original). 
140. Id. at 780. 
141. Id. 
142. Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015). 
143. Id. at 288 & n.3. 
144. See id. at 288–89. 
145. COLO. R. EVID. 606(b). 
LEONETTI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:47 PM 
224 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:205 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Pena-Rodriguez’s conviction on the 
ground that the “plain language” of Rule 606(b) precluded it from considering 
the evidence of the juror’s comments during deliberations, rejecting his claim 
that Rule 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.146 
The United States Supreme Court has had two fairly recent occasions to 
visit the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which is 
substantially similar to Colorado’s rule, and upheld it both times despite 
troubling facts.  The first case was Tanner v. United States.147  Tanner’s jury 
apparently mistook his federal criminal trial for a booze cruise, drinking to 
excess, and even smoking marijuana and snorting cocaine while on breaks.148  
Some jurors were so inebriated that they passed out at one point during the 
trial.149  When Tanner sought to overturn his guilty verdict on jury-misconduct 
grounds, the lower federal courts refused to consider affidavits from concerned 
jurors describing the drug and alcohol consumption of their peers, based on 
Rule 606(b).150  The Supreme Court affirmed the denial on the basis of the 
importance of the “policy considerations” that underlay jury secrecy, namely 
the need for the “full and frank discussion in the jury room” of difficult and 
controversial issues.151  The Court also expressed concern about whether any 
jury deliberation would live up to searching scrutiny, commenting: “It is not at 
all clear . . . that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”152 
The second case was Warger v. Shauers,153 which upheld the 
constitutionality of Rule 606(b) to bar evidence that a juror had lied during voir 
dire, a scenario that a majority of federal circuits had previously held to 
constitute strong evidence of jury bias (theorizing that the only reason that a 
juror would lie about a disqualifying bias during voir dire was to get on a jury 
knowing that he or she could not decide the case impartially).154  Warger, 
however, expressly reserved decision, in a footnote, about whether there could 
be “cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right 
has been abridged.”155  The question presented in Pena-Rodriguez’s petition for 
 
146. Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 289, 291–93. 
147. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
148. Id. at 115–16. 
149. See id. at 116. 
150. See id. at 113. 
151. Id. at 119–21. 
152. Id. at 120. 
153. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014). 
154. See id. at 525, 529. 
155. See id. at 529 n.3. 
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certiorari was precisely “whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may 
bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.”156 
The Supreme Court also denied another petition for certiorari in the 2016 
term in a case involving juror bias of a non-racial variety.157  In that case, “[a] 
jury convicted Jose Felipe Velasco of committing a lewd and lascivious act 
against a child.”158  Velasco argued that his right to a fair trial with an impartial 
jury was violated when the trial court failed to discharge for bias a juror who 
failed, until after opening statements, to disclose her knowledge of an analogous 
incident at her daughter’s school.159  His challenge was rejected by the 
California Court of Appeals,160 and that rejection was upheld by the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on federal habeas review on the ground 
that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal law and was not an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.161 
The oral arguments before the Court in Pena-Rodriguez focused almost 
entirely over whether and to what extent race was “different” in a way that 
warranted an exception to the ordinary rules of verdict non-impeachment.162  
Justice Sotomayor expressed her belief that “the most pernicious and odious 
discrimination in our law is based on race,” and advocated finding non-
impeachment rules unconstitutional as applied only to issues of race.163  Justice 
Breyer noted that “race is a special problem” when it comes to the issue of the 
systemic fairness of criminal justice.164  Justice Kagan asserted the possibility 
that “the interests in preventing unfairness of this kind are much 
 
156. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) 
(No. 15-606). 
157. See Velasco v. Sherman, 137 S. Ct. 379 (2016) (Mem.), denying cert. sub nom. to Velasco 
v. Allison, 645 Fed. App’x. 598 (9th Cir. 2016), aff’g 2014 WL 1266978 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014), 
denying petition to 2013 WL 8150866 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2013), denying petition sub nom. to People 
v. Velasco, No. G042281, 2011 WL 264695 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011). 
158. Velasco, 2011 WL 264695, at *1. 
159. Id.  
160. Id. at *6. 
161. See Velasco v. Allison, No. CV 12-1011-JSL (AGR), 2013 WL 8150866 *14 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 27, 2013); Velasco, 2014 WL 1266978; Velasco, 645 F. App’x at 598. 
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) 
(No. 15-606).  See generally Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) (“Discrimination on the basis 
of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”). 
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606). 
164. Id. at 20.  
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greater; . . . verdicts based on race discrimination pose a [fundamentally 
different] harm tha[n] verdicts based on other kinds of unfairnesses,” and 
further argued that “it seems artificial not to think about the Sixth Amendment 
[right to a fair and impartial jury] as [being] informed by the principles of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”165  She also noted the special nature of race in the 
criminal-justice system, explaining: “[T]here’s a special kind of harm . . . in 
punishing people because of their race.  And maybe especially because race is 
so associated with particular stereotypes respecting criminality, . . . it’s also the 
worst thing that you can suggest about the criminal justice system, that it allows 
that to happen.”166 
In its opinion in Pena-Rodriguez, the Court found that Rule 606(b) violated 
Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury as applied 
to the situation involving the juror’s explicitly racist comments, holding that 
the Sixth Amendment required a reviewing court to admit and consider the 
evidence of racial animus from deliberations.167  In reaching its decision, the 
Court emphasized the “distinct” role of racism in the criminal trial process, 
requiring “added precaution,” noting what it termed the “imperative to purge 
racial prejudice from the administration of justice” because “racial 
discrimination in the jury system posed a particular threat both to the promise 
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial.”168  The 
Court found that “the Tanner safeguards may be less effective in rooting out 
racial bias than other kinds of bias.”169  The Court concluded: “The 
unmistakable principle underlying [the Court’s] precedents [prohibiting state-
sponsored racial discrimination in the jury system] is that discrimination on the 
basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice.’”170  The Court described “racial bias” as “a familiar 
and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury” and that 
it “implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”171 
 
165. Id. at 29–30. 
166. Id. at 30–31. 
167. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
168. Id. at 867–69. 
169. Id. at 869. 
170. Id. at 868 (citation omitted). 
171. Id. 
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V. SMOKING GUNS & DOG WHISTLES 
That the Court simply removed otherwise insurmountable procedural 
barriers in these cases is clear.  Justice Breyer’s comments during the oral 
arguments in Buck are particularly illustrative: 
 We do know that the prosecutor asked the expert witness, is it correct 
that the race factor, [B]lack, increases the future dangerousness for 
various complicated reasons.  And he says, yes. 
. . . . 
 . . . [T]he issue here is, is there some good reason why this 
person shouldn’t have been able to reopen his case?  I mean, 
that’s the question.  What’s the reason?172 
Chief Justice Roberts chimed in and asked the Texas Solicitor General, 
“[W]ouldn’t it seem pretty straightforward to say, okay, maybe he’s right, 
maybe he’s wrong, but at least he’s made a substantial showing.  Let’s give him 
a Certificate of Appealability, and then we’ll go through the normal procedures 
on the merits?”173 
Dissenting in Buck, Justice Thomas complained: “Having settled on a 
desired outcome, the Court bulldoze[d] procedural obstacles and misapplie[d] 
settled law to justify it.”174  He went on to note: 
[A]fter chastising the Court of Appeals for making an end run 
around the COA standard in order to reach the merits of 
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) claim, the Court d[id] precisely that.  
Astonishingly, the Court also decide[d] the merits of 
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim—an issue that was not 
even ‘addressed by the Fifth Circuit.’   
      This unapologetic course reversal—made without so much 
as a hint of the irony—is striking.175   
He concluded that “[p]ermitting a defendant to file a Rule 60(b) motion years 
after the fact functionally eviscerates the statute of limitations [for federal 
 
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049).  
Justice Breyer’s argument that the Court ought not to let procedural barriers interfere with Buck having 
one full hearing on the merits of his claim is particularly striking when compared with his comments 
at oral arguments during Richter.  When Richter’s attorney argued that Richter had not had an 
adjudication of the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim at the California Supreme 
Court, Justice Breyer responded, rather blithely: “But if, in this case, [the California Supreme Court] 
did reject it on a procedural ground, and it was a reasonable ground that they applied consistently, then 
the Ninth Circuit or the Federal courts couldn’t consider the claim at all; is that right?”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 14, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2010) (No. 09-587). 
173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–36, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).   
174. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 780–81 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
175. Id. at 782 (citations omitted). 
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habeas review of state convictions].”176  Justice Alito similarly complained, 
dissenting in Pena-Rodriguez, that “the majority barely bother[ed] to engage 
with the policy issues implicated by no-impeachment rules.”177 
One thing that unites these three cases—Foster, Buck, and Pena-
Rodriguez—is that they do not involve subtle or debatable issues of implicit 
bias or dog-whistle racism.  They involve explicit, intentional appeals to racial 
bias—as close to a smoking gun as one is ever likely to see in a contested racial-
equality challenge in the twenty-first century.  Justice Alito described the race-
based dangerousness testimony in Buck as “indefensible”178 and the juror’s 
remarks in Pena-Rodriguez as “very blatant.”179  Justice Thomas described the 
testimony in Buck as “expressly racial.”180  Justice Kagan described the remarks 
in Pena-Rodriguez as “a screaming race bias in the jury room . . . the best 
smoking gun evidence you’re ever going to see about race bias in the jury 
room.”181  The majority in Pena-Rodgriguez expressly limited its decision to 
“overt racial bias” and described the juror comments at issue as “egregious and 
unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias.”182 
Courts have generally refused to take on “subtler” forms of racial 
discrimination.  For example, in People v. Taylor, Taylor was a Black man 
charged with capital murder for raping and murdering an elderly white 
woman.183  Prior to jury selection, the trial court gave prospective jurors a 
questionnaire that included four questions meant to elicit information about 
their racial attitudes.184  When the written responses of several jurors included 
ambiguous or inconsistent answers about their racial attitudes, the trial court 
refused Taylor’s request to ask follow-up questions to clarify the responses.185  
For example, two jurors answered both that they had no racial prejudices and 
that they could not be fair and impartial jurors in a case in which a Black 
defendant was accused of committing crimes against a white woman.186  
 
176. Id. at 785.  Justice Thomas made a similar observation dissenting in Pena-Rodriguez, 
complaining that the majority had “impose[d] a uniform national rule” in an “attempt to stimulate a 
‘thoughtful, rational dialogue’ on race relations.”  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
177. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049). 
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606). 
180. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 785 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
181. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606). 
182. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869–70. 
183. See 229 P.3d 12, 29 (Cal. 2010). 
184. Id. at 43. 
185. See id. at 44. 
186. Id. 
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Another juror characterized her racial prejudices as “mild” because she was 
“fearful around large numbers of [B]lacks, Hispanics—or even [W]hites—if it 
[was] an unsafe area.”187  Nonetheless, the trial court conducted no additional 
inquiry, and the jurors were ultimately seated for Taylor’s trial.188  On appeal, 
the California Supreme Court rejected Taylor’s claim that the trial court’s 
questioning regarding potential racial bias was inadequate because “the juror 
questionnaire gave the prospective jurors a clear opportunity to disclose views 
about racial bias that would warrant their excusal from the jury” and the voir 
dire, “when viewed as a whole, was not so inadequate as to render his trial 
fundamentally unfair.”189 
In State v. Tucker, Tucker, a Black man, was convicted of the brutal beating 
and rape of a white woman.190  On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
rejected Tucker’s claim that the trial court had inappropriately denied several 
of his challenges of prospective jurors for cause, including two jurors who 
admitted that they were philosophically opposed to interracial marriage, one of 
whom said that she “just wouldn’t want [her] daughter to marry one” and that 
she had been uncomfortable when she previously lived in what she described 
as a “[B]lack neighborhood.”191  After admonishing that “[t]here are some 
questions regarding racial attitudes the responses to which may raise red flags 
that should heighten the attention of the court,” the court nonetheless held that 
the trial court’s failure to strike the jurors had not constituted an abuse of 
discretion.192 
In Commonwealth v. McCowen, McCowen, who was Black, was convicted 
of a brutal rape and murder.193  Approximately a month after his conviction, 
McCowen moved for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors based on information 
that the jury’s deliberations had been infected by three separate incidents 
involving racial prejudice.194  In the first incident, a juror said that she was 
frightened of McCowen because he was “big” and “[B]lack” and had been 
trying to “intimidate” her by staring at her during the trial.195  In the second 
incident, a different juror opined that bruises like those found on the victim’s 
 
187. Id. (alterations in original). 
188. Id. at 45. 
189. Id. (citation omitted). 
190. See State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1069–70 (Conn. 1993). 
191. Id. at 1069, 1073, 1075–77. 
192. Id. at 1078, 1080. 
193. 939 N.E.2d 735, 742 (Mass. 2010) 
194. Id. at 761. 
195. Id. 
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body would result “when a big [B]lack guy beats up on a small woman.”196  In 
the third incident, a third juror stated that he did not like Black people because 
of “what they are capable of.”197  The trial court denied McCowen’s motion for 
a new trial, reasoning that none of the jurors’ actions constituted racial bias.198  
With regard to the first juror, the trial court found that there was no evidence 
that her fear of McCowen was “tied . . . to [his] race.”199  With regard to the 
second juror, the court found that her comment constituted neither “overt 
prejudice” nor “veiled or subconscious bias or stereotyping,” but rather that it 
“was descriptive in nature and intent” and that any racial stereotype that it 
invoked was “inherent in the facts of the case.”200  With regard to the third juror, 
the trial court found that his comment was not an expression of “racial 
animus.”201  On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that 
the trial court had neither erred in its finding of facts nor in its legal conclusion 
that a new trial for McCowen was warranted, contrasting the jurors comments 
in McCowen with a juror comment in another case that “the goddamned spic is 
guilty just sitting there; look at him.  Why bother having the trial.”202 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The deeper question that remains, therefore, is whether the Supreme 
Court’s recent willingness to bend the procedural rules and open itself to claims 
of racial bias, if that is what the Court is exhibiting, will extend to the more 
nefarious, systemic, and common implicit biases that pervade the system.203  As 
Justice Marshall pointed out, dissenting from the Court’s denial of certiorari in 
Wilkerson: “If such ‘smoking guns’ are ignored, we have little hope of 
combating the more subtle forms of racial discrimination.”204  What about 
 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. at 763. 
199. Id. at 762. 
200. Id. at 762–63. 
201. Id. at 762. 
202. Id. at 765–66. 
203. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 (2010) (“Implicit biases are the plethora of fears, feelings, 
perceptions, and stereotypes that lie deep within our subconscious, without our conscious permission 
or acknowledgement.”); see also Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: 
A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 961–62 (1982) (“[Implied bias] is 
based on the recognition that certain relationships between a litigant and a prospective juror are likely 
to result, consciously or unconsciously, in the bias of the juror.”). 
204. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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credibility determinations that are infused with stereotype-congruent responses 
to witnesses or parties of color—e.g., a jury’s determination of whether a 
defendant acted in self-defense, a judge’s determination of the legally 
permissible amount of force in apprehending a putatively “dangerous” suspect 
of color, or a lawyer’s use of subconscious stereotypes during the exercise of 
peremptory challenges?205  How should courts deal with well-documented 
implicit biases in the criminal-justice system like racially biased 
“misremembering” and the “shooter bias”?206 
 Justice Alito reformulated this Article’s question about whether the 
Court is prepared to take on these subtler, more implicit forms of racism into a 
slippery-slope argument in his dissenting opinion in Pena-Rodriguez: 
Attempting to limit the damage worked by its decision, the 
Court says that only “clear” expressions of bias must be 
admitted, but judging whether a statement is sufficiently 
“clear” will often not be easy.  Suppose that the allegedly 
biased juror in this case never made reference to Peña-
Rodriguez’s race or national origin but said that he had a lot of 
experience with “this macho type” and knew that men of this 
kind felt that they could get their way with women.  Suppose 
that other jurors testified that they were certain that “this 
macho type” was meant to refer to Mexican or Hispanic 
men.207 
Of course, this author hopes that the Court will go down that slippery slope, 
but the extent of the Court’s willingness to address these bigger—and more 
prevalent—issues of implicit, dog-whistle biases, remains to be seen. 
 
205. See Montoya, supra note 58, at 1024 (“Batson also fails to recognize that much 
discrimination in jury selection, like discrimination generally, is the product of unconscious racism and 
sexism.”). 
206. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 357 (2007) (“The ‘shooter bias’ refers to participants’ propensity 
to shoot Black perpetrators more quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide 
not to shoot White bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders.”). 
207. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
